


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A State of the British  
Authority in Bengal under the  
Government of Mr. Hastings, Ex-  
emplified in the Principles  
and Conduct of the Marhatta War

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A  
S T A T E  
OF THE  
BRITISH AUTHORITY IN BENGAL

UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF

MR. H A S T I N G S,  
EXEMPLIFIED IN THE PRINCIPLES  
AND CONDUCT OF  
THE MARHATTA WAR,  
AND HIS  
NEGOCIATIONS  
WITH  
MOODAJEE BOOSLA,  
RAJAH of BERAR.

From authentic Documents.

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( iii )

TO THE  
COURT OF DIRECTORS  
OF THE  
EAST INDIA COMPANY.

GENTLEMEN,

THE following papers, as far as they lay claim to YOUR attention, should rather serve to remind, than to inform. I am persuaded that your inestimable archives are consulted by you, without remission: and doubtless, the lights, which are there only to be obtained, alone decide your judgment and your conduct in all interests of the Company. It is to be lamented, that all access to this great source of information should be rigorously refused to the Public. The cause of truth and justice can rarely profit by concealment. It is the natural tendency, and, too often, the infamous

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purpose,

purpose, of that dark mysterious policy which shuns examination, to perpetuate error, to render abuses inveterate, and to shelter crimes.

Impressed with these sentiments, I shall make no apology for bringing forward to Public notice the character of the Government of Bengal, under the administration of Mr. HASTINGS. I have not hesitated to shew, in one striking instance of internal arrangement\*, that the contempt with which this Gentleman has uniformly received the commands of the Court of Directors, is systematical, and that He bids defiance to his masters upon Principle. I shall now venture to produce him on the scene in his career of Conquest; and shall prove that, in Peace and War, he is *equally* your Servant; that he has the same Maxims for the

\* See a State of the British Authority in Bengal.



Field and for the Cabinet, and that He is alike happy in bearing away the Palm of civil and military Disobedience. To compleat the Monument of this Gentleman's political fame, it will be a pleasing labour, to shew that the same generous disdain of his Superiors has accompanied him through all the Manœuvres of *his* System of finance; to display *his* Skill in improving, *his* Tenderneſs in fostering, *his* Prudence in diſpenſing, the Treasure of the Provinces of whoſe Welfare he is appointed the Tutelary Guardian.

I am aware that, to the common Reader, theſe ſuggeſtions may appear unfair, and theſe Imputations cruel. But you, Gentlemen, will not reſuſe to bear teſtimony to my Candour. The Court of Directors have long been acquainted with the true complexion of this Governor's Principles. In the Company's General letter

letter to Bengal, dated the 23d of December 1773, his conduct in various instances, is qualified by the Epithets, "INDECENT, PRESUMPTUOUS, UNWARRANTABLE, ILLEGAL," and in the letter from the Court of Directors to Bengal, dated the 14th of May 1779, the Expedition which makes the subject of the following sheets, is treated as a direct Violation of PRUDENCE, POLICY, and GOOD FAITH.

If now it should be asked, by some simple Observer of human Actions, upon what Principles we are to explain this strange, but continued, series of reproach and confidence, of censure and reward, I must own I should unwillingly attempt the solution of so unnatural a phenomenon. The Abbé Raynal, speaking of the Decline of the Dutch East India Company, and accounting for it, cites the following remarkable circumstance. "The  
 " contempt

“ contempt of decency was pushed so far,  
“ that a Governor General finding himself  
“ convicted of having pillaged the Trea-  
“ sury to an enormous excess, was not  
“ afraid to justify his conduct, by pro-  
“ ducing a full Power signed by the Ma-  
“ nagers of the Company at home.” You  
have now a favourable opportunity of  
removing far from yourselves the ignomi-  
ny of the application; and of consoling the  
Public, by the Resolutions You are about  
to take, with the hope that the present  
Court of Directors will neither be insen-  
sible to their Duty or careless of their Ho-  
nor. It shall be my Province, Gentlemen,  
to suggest fresh objects for the Exercise of  
Your Political Wisdom and Patriotic Virtue.

THE EDITOR.

A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

**I**T is thought needless to make any Apology for the Form in which these Documents are given to the Public. Persons conversant in India Affairs will even draw a Proof of their Authenticity from their present Arrangement.

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\* \* A printed copy of these Documents was sent to each Member of the Court of Directors on Tuesday the 2d Instant, a day appointed by them for enquiring into the subject to which they relate. In the present edition a small alteration is made in the arrangement of the Extracts from Consultations, for the purpose of rendering them more intelligible to the common reader. There is no change in the Matter or Facts.

Jan. 16, 1781.

A S T A T E

A  
S T A T E  
OF THE  
BRITISH AUTHORITY IN BENGAL  
UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF

MR. H A S T I N G S,

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**T**HE abstracts annexed will serve for an index to the Consultations, and to point out such parts of them as may deserve particular attention, whenever it shall be thought fit to make formal and regular inquiry into the whole transaction. The principles and conduct of the measure are minutely canvassed in the minutes of the minority. It may be useful, however, to collect into one view some of the most striking circumstances belonging to both.

I. The original resolutions of the Governor General and Council of the 2d of February, 1778, for supporting Bombay, profess to have in view the restoration of Ragoba, conformable to the plan communicated in a letter from that Presidency of the 12th of December, 1777, but in no shape to violate the treaty of Poona. In their subsequent letter of the 20th of January, 1778, they inform the Board that the overtures

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made

made by the Ministerial Chiefs had produced no effect, and that *they had immediately resolved that nothing could be done* unless Sucuram Baboo joined in the application, which he never has done. This Board, nevertheless, persist in sending the detachment across India, but now take other ground to justify the measure, viz. a supposed connection between the French and the Poona government.

II. The principal proof of this connection, repeatedly urged and insisted on by Mr. Hastings, was, that the Marhattas had given the port of Choul, near Bombay, to the French. Yet, notwithstanding the peremptory assertions so often used by the Governor on this subject, and notwithstanding Monsieur Bellecombe, so long ago as January last, was said to have gone in person to take possession, the French, at this hour, are not masters of Choul, nor ever likely to possess it. In the same spirit, and for the same purpose, the negociations of Monsieur St. Lubin have been urged, and represented in the most formidable point of view. At this distance from England, a cloud of words is sufficient to veil, diminish, or magnify any object, to suit the wishes and designs of men in power here. In the present instance, the Court of Directors will find lights enough in the Consultations of the Board, to shew them with what boldness and facility facts are supposed, discoloured, and exaggerated,

aggerated, and the most alarming, as well as chimerical consequences deduced from them. They will judge whether Mr. Hastings, on his own state of facts, has taken measures suitable to the occasion; whether the march of an army into the heart of Indostan could, at any time, have had any other object but a union with Moodajee Boosla; and whether this object was not carefully kept out of sight, till either the detachment might be so far advanced as not to be able to retreat with safety, or till other circumstances should arise which might furnish pretences for adopting a new system, or rather for discovering the true purpose of the persons who planned the expedition. This observation kept in view, will serve for a leading clue through all the windings of this extraordinary transaction.

III. In the course of the proceedings it will appear, that when the march of a reinforcement to Bombay was resolved on, Mr. Francis constantly urged that it ought to be sent from Madras by the way of Anjano, and replaced, if necessary, from Bengal; and that the Presidency of Bombay recommended this mode, *as the best and easiest*. In several of Mr. Hastings's minutes, particularly one of the 12th of October, the Court of Directors will see how affectedly this proposition has been slighted, and what sort of arguments have been urged against it. Mr. Hastings affirms, "that it did not even deserve

“ consideration; and that, with superior difficulties, and a dangerous navigation, the march from Pondicherry would exceed that from Culpee in length by one third of the distance.” Yet the route by Anjango is well known, and has been repeatedly used by detachments to and from Bombay. The battalion of Sepoys, which marched about February, 1774, to join Colonel Keating, followed this route, and arrived at Bombay without the loss of a man; and even the Governor General himself, on the 2d of February, 1778, proposed a letter to the Presidency of Fort St. George, in which the earnest desire of this Government is expressed, that they should order the detachment, applied for by the President and Council of Bombay, to march immediately to their assistance.

With this evidence before the Court of Directors of the facility of the route by Anjango, and considering that the strength of this detachment, added to the Madras army, might with ease have swept all the French settlements on both coasts, and saved the greatest part of the blood and treasure which Pondicherry has cost, they are to judge what motives but that which I have assigned could possibly have determined Mr. Hastings to send the detachment through an immense unknown continent, in preference to a route so perfectly known, and constantly practised.



IV. The season in which the troops were to march was as strenuously objected to by the minority as the route. In reply to this objection, the Court of Directors will see with what perseverance Mr. Hastings has maintained, that no season could be more happily chosen than the beginning of May: That the violent heats would soon be over, and that the succeeding rains would be a relief to the troops, and facilitate the march. To those who have experienced the rains of India, this idea will undoubtedly appear new and extraordinary. Colonel Leslie's letters, particularly his private ones, will shew that nothing in fact could be so ill founded. He uniformly attributes the delay of his march to the torrents of rain which had overflowed the country, destroyed the roads, and made even small rivers and nullas impassable: light troops, without incumbrance, may perhaps move in any season; but it is not easy to convey a train of artillery, with stores, ammunition, camp-equipage, and provisions for a body of people not less than 36,000 in number, in a tempestuous season, and through a country intersected with numberless streams, if not generally overflowed.

V. In the Consultation of the 12th of October, the Court of Directors will observe what violent censures are thrown upon the Presidency of Bombay, and how much pains are taken to  
fix

fix upon *them* the responsibility of every miscarriage that has happened, or that may happen hereafter in the operations of the detachment.

“ They have done nothing ; they have attempted nothing ; they have neither availed themselves, nor wish to avail themselves of events ; they have no instrument left, nor any inclination to seek for one. In short, we are abandoned by them, after all that we have done for their relief.”

The minority have no concern in the charges now exhibited against the Presidency of Bombay, nor does it belong to *them* to undertake their defence. Mr. Francis saw, and insisted on, the weakness and unsteadiness of their councils, at a point of time, (22d June, 1788) when more was in the power of the Board than barely to lament the effects of them. It rests with Mr. Hastings to account for, and justify, his conduct, in leaving the army, as he does, under the guidance of a Council, on whose prudence, steadiness, and activity, he at the same moment professes to place so little dependence.

VI. The Court of Directors will undoubtedly consider the enormous expence, as well as all the other consequences likely to attend this measure. The staff; the stores; a train of artillery, and allowances and supplies of all sorts, regulated solely by the commanding officer's direction, and the whole charge of the detachment

ment

ment to be defrayed by remittances on this government. In the beginning of October, when Col. Goddard took the command, the military chest was empty; so that at that time they must have spent twelve lacks, which were to have carried them to Bombay, besides the advances of subsistence which the several battalions must have received before they began their march. What the total expence of the measure will amount to, or when it will end, can only be the subject of very alarming conjectures. It is only in its infancy at present; yet if, in addition to the direct charge of moving with such a body of troops out of Bengal, a due proportion of the augmentation here is carried to the same account as it ought to be, I presume that thirty lacks \* will not much exceed the real expence already incurred by the measure. It is a growing expence; since every step the detachment takes from our frontier removes it so much the further from any possible check or controul over its disbursements.

VII. The private correspondence carried on between the Governor General and the commanding officer ought certainly to be an object of consideration. It is very difficult and distress-

\* On the 1st of March, 1780, the detachment, together with the parties under Major Carnac and Captain Popham, had cost the Company upwards of 82 lacks, independent of remittances to Bombay.

ling to those members of the Council, who disapprove of such a proceeding, to express their disapprobation of it in terms that do not imply personal distrust of their President. There is no language in which a total want of confidence in his personal honor and veracity can be conveyed without a direct affront to him.

Mr. Francis, in his minute of the 16th of November, has objected to the continuance of this correspondence, in the most guarded and moderate terms; but it was rather with a view to exculpate himself, than with any hope of influencing Mr. Hastings's conduct. The practice is so evidently wrong, and open to so many obvious ill consequences, that it requires no illustration. The Court of Directors are to consider what fair and justifiable purpose it can possibly answer.

By Colonel Leslie's private letters, which Mr. Hastings was, in some sort, compelled to lay before the Board on the 22d of October, (tho' not accompanied with his own, as they ought to have been) it appears, that he possessed information, in many instances, which ought to have been communicated directly and immediately to the Board. The letter of the 30th of July in particular, establishes two very material facts. 1st, That whereas Mr. Francis appears, on the face of the Consultations to ob-

serve

serve Colonel Leslie's conduct with attention, and to censure it with some degree of severity, while Mr. Hastings constantly supports and defends him; it is nevertheless true, that at least as early as the end of June, Mr. Hastings must have thought infinitely worse of Col. Leslie's character and conduct than even Mr. Francis, who had no lights to guide him but the public letters.

2dly, That whereas Mr. Hastings about the end of June, if not sooner, must have conceived the very worst opinion possible of Col. Leslie, he takes no step to remove him from the command till the 12th of October, when, in all probability, he had heard of his death, or at least that there was no chance of his recovery: so that, on his own principles, he must have left the conduct of this most important enterprize in the hands of a man whom he does not scruple to accuse in the grossest manner of *ignorance, presumption, and rapacity*. In return however, the Court of Directors will observe, that Colonel Leslie expressed no apprehension of the Governor's resentment, or of any effects it can produce; but on the contrary, sets him at defiance in plain terms, and refuses to correspond with him any longer.

VIII. Supposing it possible that every objection to the measure, on the score of prudence or expediency, could be answered, or removed;

or that any degree of success should hereafter furnish an unexpected argument in its defence, there is still another, and a most important point of view, in which it becomes the Company's dignity and wisdom to consider it.

When Mr. Hastings engages the Company's arms in offensive wars without necessity; when he complicates their government in treaties and alliances with the Indian powers, of which war, acquisition, and conquest are the sole object; when he sends their troops far away from the defence of their territories; when he disturbs the peace of India; and when he avows his vain ambitious purposes so far as to declare that, " \* If the British arms and influence have suffered a severe check in the Western world, it is the more incumbent on those who are charged with the interests of Great-Britain in the East, to exert themselves for the retrieval of the national loss; that we have the means in our power; and that with such superior advantages as we possess over every power which can oppose us, *we should not act merely on the defensive;*" does he not subvert the fundamental principles of the Company's policy; does he not disobey their repeated and most peremptory orders, and transgress every line of limitation, which they had prescribed to their servants for the administra-

\* Consultation, 22d June, 1778.

tion of their affairs? If the affirmative should appear true, the Court of Directors will undoubtedly recall to their remembrance the principles on which the Rohilla war was unanimously condemned by them, and how grossly their condemnation of that measure has been slighted. They will reflect on the nature and extent of the trust reposed in them by the Company, and by the nation; and seriously consider on how precarious a foundation the British empire in India stands; when one daring individual can, at his pleasure, subvert every principle of their government, violate their most positive orders and solemn instructions, contemn their authority, and set their power at defiance. It will not, I trust, be too late for them to weigh the disgraceful and dangerous consequences of uniting constant condemnation with constant impunity in the persons of Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, and of continuing two men in stations of the highest trust and dignity, whom, if we may rely on the opinion they have repeatedly expressed of their conduct and character, they ought not to think worthy of the lowest.

The motion of the 23d of November appeared some days after the preceding observations were drawn up. In addition to the remarks made upon it in Mr. Francis's minute of the same day, the Court of Directors have only to compare it with the language held by

Mr. Hastings on the 12th of October, and the indignation with which he pretended to resent a suspicion expressed by Mr. Francis, that the detachment was really never meant to proceed to Bombay.

“ If there are men in England so devoid of  
 “ common sense, as to suppose it possible for  
 “ me to have formed a plan ostensibly professed  
 “ for the assistance of Bombay, but really  
 “ meant as a cover for other designs, let them;  
 “ whoever they be, or in whatever relation they  
 “ may stand to this government, such opinions  
 “ will give me no kind of concern.”

In the latter part of this declaration, there is certainly no reason to question his sincerity. The mystery is now unfolded, and all farther concealment either useless or impracticable. The great original difficulty with Mr. Hastings was, to find pretences for so extraordinary and questionable a step, as that of sending an army out of these provinces into the heart of India. To remove it, no assertions were spared, no artifice omitted, no sophistry unemployed: That point once carried, and the decisive act of crossing the Jumna once done, the scene changes.— New facts are asserted, new principles established, and new objects proposed. The same army which originally was to have reinstated Ragoba, and which, even so late as the 15th of October, was still professedly destined to support that  
 interest,



interest, is now to place Moodajee Boosla at the head of the Marhatta Empire, and to join with him in an invasion of the Decan. At the same time the necessity of providing for the immediate safety of Bombay against a French invasion, which on the 12th of October was urged, and insisted on as a reason for leaving the detachment under the command of that Presidency, is totally forgotten. Yet there is no new fact of any kind before the Board to warrant a supposition that this object is less necessary to be provided for at the present moment than it was on the 12th of October, when Mr. Hastings declared; “ That if it was necessary to strengthen the Presidency of Bombay when the first idea of it was suggested, it was much more so now, when we have been told by the highest Authority, that a powerful armament has been prepared in France, the first object of which was an attack upon Bombay; and when we know with moral certainty, that all the powers of the adjacent continent are read to join the invasion.”

This state of facts, whether real or supposed, remaining unaltered, the powers given to the Presidency of Bombay to call the detachment to their assistance are revoked, and the army ordered to proceed to Berar, and to halt there. Yet now we find, by the last letter from Poona, that

that the President and Council of Bombay, relying on the repeated promises of assistance given them by this government, had taken their final resolution to act immediately against the Marhattas; that is, in support of Ragoba's pretensions to the sovereign power of the Marhatta state. At the same time, supposing Colonel Goddard to have been able to penetrate into Berar, and to have carried his instructions into execution, the faith of the company will have been engaged to Moodajee Boosla, to support his pretensions to the same object; so that if no external impediment were to defeat the operation of the opposite principles on which the two Presidencies are now acting, it might happen that one English army might meet another in the field, and that the competitors would have a right to insist upon the public faith, severally pledged to them, by the Company's representatives, and to bring their respective auxiliaries into action. To avoid this extremity there can be no resource but treachery and breach of faith to one of the parties at least, if not to both.

## A B S T R A C T S

FROM

## C O N S U L T A T I O N S.

Jan. 29, 1778. **T**HE march of the detachment under the command of Colonel Leslie originated from a letter from the Presidency of Bombay, dated 12th of December, 1777, in which they give notice to the Governor General and Council of an offer indirectly made them, by some members of the Ministerial Party, to reinstate Ragoba, and of their own determination to accept such offer, whenever it should be authenticated by a direct engagement from the Ministers, and to march with Ragoba to Poona.

On this day Mr. Francis entered a formal protest against the proceedings of the Bombay Presidency. Mr. Hastings proposed a series of questions on the same subject, meaning that the resolutions thereupon should be the basis of the future measures of the Board. The general tendency of the questions was to approve their conduct, and to promise them support.

2d February.—Mr. Hastings's questions are considered, and carried by his casting voice. He then proposed to take General Stibbert's opinion on the means of sending a reinforcement to Bombay, and the propriety of augmenting the Sepoy corps; and concluded with a pressing letter to Fort St. George, to induce them to forward a reinforcement from thence immediately to Bombay.

9th February.—Mr. Hastings informs the Board, that he has private intelligence that Monsieur Bellecombe is gone to the Malabar Coast, with a view to take possession of Choul, a port-town near Bombay, supposed to be ceded to the French by the Marhattas.

23d.—Read the Bombay letter of the 20th of January, on which the Governor's motion for sending them a reinforcement by the way of Calpee appears to be founded. Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler protested in the strongest terms against the resolution of the majority, which followed the motion.

13th March.—On the receipt of the Company's orders of the 4th of July 1777, Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis joined in an address to the Governor, and urged the Board to countermand the detachment, but without effect.

18th.—The majority sent orders and instructions to the Presidency of Bombay of the most violent and hostile tendency to the Poona government\*, and equivalent in effect to a declaration of war with the Marhattas. Mr. Francis and Mr. Whéler entered their protests, with their reasons.

30th.† —A regiment of cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Goddard, ordered to join Leslie's detachment.

6th April. — The detachment ordered to march, though letters from Bombay represent every thing there in a state of tranquillity. No motion whatever yet made in favour of Ragoba, nor any effect or consequence from the pretended overtures on the part of the Ministers, mentioned in their letter of the 12th December, 1777.

11th May.—A letter from Bombay of the 5th of April, having advised the Board of a revolution at Poona, by which Ragoba is said to be re-established, Mr. Francis moved, that the march of the detachment should be suspended, as no longer necessary. The majority persist,

\* Vide Consultations 23d March.

† Military Consultations 27th March.

16th.\*—Mr. Francis again pressed the recall of the detachment, and continued the debate, but to no purpose. (19th.) Mr. Hastings constantly affirms that the rainy season is favourable to the march of the troops,

8th June.—Mr. Francis again urged the recall of the detachment, on account of the opposition given to Leslie on crossing the Jumna, and the future difficulties he would probably meet with. Mr. Hastings in reply declared his *unalterable determination to prosecute the measure to the utmost of his power to its conclusion.*

11th June.—Letter from Bombay, dated 2d May, to inform the Board, that they have sent an order to Leslie not to advance any further until he may again hear from them. This step is said to be founded “on the opinion they have formed  
“on the present state of affairs, and their desire  
“to save the Company from the heavy ex-  
“pence, and their troops from the dangers and  
“difficulties of a march from our provinces to  
“that side of India.”

21st.—Letter from Bombay of the 9th of May, to inform the Board that they had reversed the preceding resolution within two days after it was taken, and ordered the detachment

\* Vide Consultations 21st May.

to proceed; but no reason is assigned for this alteration.

22d.—Considering this extraordinary fluctuation in the councils of that Presidency, and that no motives whatsoever were assigned for it, Mr. Francis represented to the Board the hazard and discredit of leaving the detachment at the discretion of such councils, and on that ground again urged the necessity of recalling it; but in vain.

29th June.—Received a letter, dated 20th May, from Bombay, desiring, that for the future, any reinforcement to be sent them might proceed *directly from Madras, as the best and easiest mode*. It will appear hereafter, that about this time Mr. Hastings had intirely altered the extraordinary opinion he had hitherto possessed of Colonel Leslie's merit and qualifications.

6th July.—On this day Mr. Hastings made his first direct move towards the object, which he since appears to have had originally at heart, of an alliance with Moodajee Boosla, and which I think will appear to have been the real object of this expedition. Colonel Leslie is now ordered to take his route through Berar, instead of the strait road through Malva, the Chief of which, Modajee Sindy, is now, for the first time, known “ to have had no connection with this

“ government, and to have always been represented as a partizan of Nana Furnese.”

7th.—Advices received this day from Cairo of a war in Europe. The majority determine that the detachment shall halt in Berar.

9th July. — When the Board expected from the Governor General a plan for the defence of Bengal against a French invasion, he produced, instead of it, a laboured history of the Ram Raja, the Constitution of the Marhatta Empire, and Moodajee Boosla's rights or pretensions to the sovereignty; and concluded with recommending that a Treaty of Alliance should be formed with Moodajee Boosla, and that a Company's Servant should be immediately deputed to him with full powers for that purpose.

10th.—Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis warmly opposed the measure, and urged the necessity of putting Bengal in a state of defence, recalling the detachment, and sending a reinforcement from Madras to Bombay, to act solely on a defensive plan.

11th.—Treaty of Alliance resolved on by the majority, but the plan of it not produced—Mr. Elliott appointed to conduct it,

18th.



18th.—Mr. Elliott's instructions produced this day, and voted, notwithstanding the strongest opposition that could be given to the measure by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler. It appears that Ragoba was to be laid aside, and Moodajee Boosla placed at the head of the Marhatta Empire, and supported in his pretensions against the Subah of the Decan. This scheme of operations is recommended by the Governor General, at the opening of a French war. During all this time the detachment halted at Chatterpour, a few days march from the Jumna. It appears by Colonel Leslie's private letters, that Mr. Hastings must have been perfectly acquainted with his transactions, yet at the Board he constantly defends him, and even recommends approving the attack of Mow, though *he* could not be unacquainted with the true motives of that barbarous measure.

17th August.—Received a letter from Bombay, dated 25th July, saying that they had declared the Treaty of Poona violated, and no longer binding on the part of the Company. That they had determined to accept the offers of Moraba, and other Chiefs who had declared in favour of Ragoba, and to march with him to Poona in the beginning of September. Mr. Hastings, notwithstanding his projected Treaty with Moodajee Boosla, approves their plan for reinstating Ragoba, yet represents his cause as  
desperate,

desperate, and the conduct of the Presidency of Bombay as *equivalent to a resolution to do nothing*: that is, he supports their measures, though against his belief of their taking effect. By letters from Colonel Leslie, it appears that the Presidency of Bombay have directed him to alter his route; that is, not to proceed through Guzerat to Broach, or Surat, but to proceed more southerly towards Poona.

31st August.—Some reflections having been made by Mr. Francis on Colonel Leslie's extraordinary delay at Chatterpour, the Board agreed with him, that the causes of it deserved to be inquired into.

2d September.—In the course of a warm debate on Colonel Leslie's continuance at Chatterpour, Mr. Hastings uniformly defends and supports him, and with much apparent confidence in Colonel Leslie's conduct, refers to the event to justify it.

5th October.—From the 2d of September to this day, the Board had no material advices from Colonel Leslie. He had altered the position of his camp, but it did not appear that he had any serious intention to continue his march. Mr. Francis urged that his conduct should be inquired into, but Mr. Hastings requested that the inquiry might be deferred. On receipt of  
the

the news of Mr. Elliot's death, Mr. Hastings moved that the commission should be continued, and another person appointed to carry it into execution.

7th October.—This last motion withdrawn by the Governor, who persists in his project of an alliance with Moodajee Boosla, but now declares *that it is always more advantageous to wait for solicitations than to make advances.* The new instructions now proposed for the march of the detachment will be found to deserve the particular attention of the Court of Directors. In this place it is sufficient to remark, that they leave the army under the orders of the Presidency of Bombay for two express purposes, viz. to support any plan or design for the restoration of Ragoba, or to provide for the immediate safety of Bombay against a French invasion. At this debate the majority, for the first time, discovered a distrust of Colonel Leslie, with some indirect professions of an intention to remove him.

12th Oct.—But, till this day, no resolution was taken to remove him from the command. The Governor now informs the Board, that it *had been the will of God to blast his designs by means which no human prudence could have foreseen, and against which therefore he had provided no resource.* Yet he affirms, “ that the effects of the  
“ detachment

“ detachment will still answer his most sanguine  
 “ hopes, and that the measure itself is as ad-  
 “ visable now, and more so, than when it was  
 “ first adopted.”

19th Oct.—The last letter written by Colonel Leslie, who died on the 3d of October, states fully the causes which have retarded his march, and accounts for his not having been hitherto more explicit in his communication to the Board, by saying, that “ he had afforded Mr. Hastings, “ *at his own desire*, a particular journal of oc-  
 “ currences, and trusted to him for such expla-  
 “ nation as the Board might desire to know.”

22d.—Mr. Hastings lays Colonel Leslie’s private letters before the Board; that dated the 30th of July deserves the most particular attention.

26th.—A letter from Bombay of the 11th of September says, “ that they have not taken any  
 “ measures in prosecution of the plan communi-  
 “ cated in their letter of the 25th of July, but  
 “ that they shall now very speedily come to  
 “ some decisive resolutions, and advise the Board  
 “ immediately of the result.”

2d November. \*—Colonel Goddard proceeds on his march to Sagur; finds the military chest

\* Consultations 2d November.

empty, and draws bills on the treasury for the subsistence of the detachment.

12th.—The Governor proposes an arrangement for supplying the detachment with money, by remittances to Naugpore, the capital of Berar. If it be not intended that the army should halt in that country, the measure is absurd; for supposing their march to Bombay to be continued without interruption, they ought to arrive there before a remittance, now made from hence, can reach them. But the proposition supposes them to want money, and to receive it more than two months hence at least, at a place a thousand miles distant from the professed place of their destination.

16th.—A private letter from Colonel Goddard of the 22d of October, to Mr. Hastings, with others from Moodajee Boosla, and his Ministers, laid before the Board. The Governor proposes to renew the negotiation with Moodajee Boosla, on the principles of Mr. Elliott's instructions, and to commit the conduct of it to Colonel Goddard, with full powers to conclude. Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler object to the private correspondence carried on between the Governor and the commanding officer of the Company's troops, and assign their reasons at large for dissenting from the motion. The resolution carried of course.

23d November\*. — A motion sent in circulation by the Governor, to revoke the powers delegated on the 15th of October to the Presidency of Bombay, of commanding the march of the detachment. Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler protest against the motion, as not only inconsistent with all the principles hitherto avowed, and with the ostensible objects hitherto proposed to be accomplished by the expedition, but as not corresponding with, or capable of being justified by the reasons assigned for it.

30th.—A letter from Mr. Lewis at Poona, dated 27th October, containing the following information: “By orders from Governor Hornby, I have sent away all the Sepoys who came with Mr. Mostyn, and am in hourly expectation of being recalled myself, as the Governor writes me that the Select Committee have determined on acting against this Government.”

21st December, 1778.—From the 15th of November to this day, the Board received but one letter from Colonel Goddard, dated the 5th of November; by which it only appears, that he was engaged in hostilities with Balajee Pundit, who harassed his march with five thousand Marhatta horse.

On the 21st of December Mr. Hastings laid before the Board a private letter of the

\* Vide Consultations 7th Dec.

16th of November, from Colonel Goddard to himself; he was then at Bursea, 25 Cofs from the Narbudda; his march still interrupted, and his supplies cut off by Balajee Pundit. He had received friendly letters from Moodajee Boosla, but observes, "That it was plain he  
 " would rather some agreement had been en-  
 " tered into before the arrival of the army in  
 " his territory."

On the same day Mr. Hastings produced a copy of a letter from Moodajee Boosla to Colonel Goddard, dated the 23d of November, which had been forwarded by Mr. Anderson, directly from Nagpour to Calcutta. The contents of this letter are of the utmost importance: He lays before Colonel Goddard, in the strongest colours, a detail of the preparations making by the Poona government to oppose his march, and of the dangers and difficulties which he must expect to meet with. He declines joining him with a body of his troops, observing, "That it could produce  
 " no good effect, but would remove the veil  
 " from the business, and leave their designs  
 " exposed; that it would destroy the friend-  
 " ship *established between him and the Peishwa,*  
 " *and Nizam ul Dowla,* and expose his domi-  
 " nions to the ravages of the armies of the  
 " Decan in Berar and at the Gauts." Finally, he advises Colonel Goddard to write all these particulars to Calcutta, and wait for or-

ders from thence; and, till their arrival, continue on the banks of the Nerbudda. In the mean time he recommends it to him, to write an amicable letter to the Peishwa, to desire a safe passage through his dominions to Bombay, with assurances that the march of the detachment had no other object than to strengthen that place against the designs of the French.

Mr. Hastings, after producing this letter, informed the Board that Moodajee Boosla had been at the point of death, and added in discourse, that he was not the real Raja of Berar, but only deputy to his son.

Mr. Francis, finding that all this important intelligence was not followed by any motion from the Governor, proposed two questions to the Board; First; "That it appeared that Moodajee Boosla was not inclined to join Colonel Goddard; Secondly; "That it was his, Moodajee Boosla's, opinion, that the continuance of his march would be attended with the greatest difficulties and dangers."—The object of these questions, if they had not been resolved in the negative, was to establish the affirmative, as a ground for recalling the detachment, or sending it along the Nerbudda to Broach.

By Moodajee Boosla's letter it appears, that on the 23d of November, he had no idea of  
breaking



breaking with the Poona Government; that he was alarmed for the safety of his own country, and very unwilling to join Colonel Goddard, or to suffer him to come into it. He speaks the language of a man of sense; but his letter discovers no appearance \* of *that approved bravery and spirit* on which Mr. Hastings professes to rest his hopes, † *that he will ardently catch at the objects presented to his ambition.* And though it be strictly true, as Mr. Hastings himself says in his letter of the 23d November to the Raja's prime minister, "*That in the whole of his conduct*" *be, Mr. Hastings, has departed from the common line of policy, and has made advances where*" *others in his situation would have waited for solicitation,*" it does not appear that all his advances have produced any favourable impression on the mind of Moodajee Boosla; at least they have hitherto had no material influence upon his conduct.

If, after all, this man be not the real Raja of Berar, it remains to be considered whether the state of Berar can be bound by any act of his, or whether the alliance, offensive and defensive, which Colonel Goddard is directed to form with him in the terms of Elliott's instructions, can be concluded with safety or honour to this government, when it is allowed that one of the

\* Vide his letter to Dewagur Punditt, 23d Nov. 1778.

† Ditto.

contracting parties has no right, in his own person, to conclude such an alliance.

28th Dec. 1778.—The Governor moves, that two battalions may be ordered immediately from the barracks near Calcutta, under the command of Major Camac, to reinforce Colonel Goddard, in order to supply all losses which the detachment may have suffered by Colonel Leslie's delays, and by the length of their march. They are to proceed to the western frontier of Palamow, and there wait the directions of Goddard, either for a junction with him for the protection of Nagpour, or to preserve the communication with these provinces.

Before the question was put, Mr. Francis desired to see the returns of the detachment, that the Board might know what loss it had really suffered, and on what grounds the reinforcement was proposed. No returns, no letters, nor explanation of any kind, were produced. Mr. Barwell expressly declared, "That there was no  
 " indispensable necessity to influence the propo-  
 " sition; and that, if he was to form his opinion  
 " simply on the necessity of the thing, he  
 " should certainly vote against the march of the  
 " troops." Mr. Hastings, under colour of an objection urged by Mr. Francis to the private correspondence carried on between him and the commanding officer, said, that he had been thereby *discouraged from affording the Board, in*  
*their*

*their collective capacity, those lights which, upon many points, were necessary for their information.* He then rambled into strictures upon a supposed inconsistency in Mr. Francis's conduct, in laying an extract of a private letter before the Board in June last, yet objecting to the authority of private letters from the commanding officer to the first and executive member of the Government, and protesting against their private correspondence. The Minutes will shew, in what manner these reflections were answered.— In this place however, it may be proper to observe, that Mr. Hastings, notwithstanding all his public declarations to the contrary, must have given credit to the extract above-mentioned; since Colonel Leslie, in his private letter of the 30th July, reproaches him with the more *than negative belief*, expressed in one of his own letters, *of the possibility of some accidental error having happened on the first day's march from Calpee*, and answered a question put to him by the Governor's order, which would have been an absurdity in terms, if Mr. Hastings did not believe the fact, viz. *why the first day's march was so fatal?*

Other observations, of much greater consequence, occur upon the proceedings of this day. A reinforcement is ordered, upon a simple presumption, that the detachment has suffered a considerable loss. No return or letters  
are

are produced to prove it, and all lights avowedly withheld from the Board. Mr. Barwell, at the same time, denies the necessity of the measure; and Mr. Hastings himself, in the course of the debate, affirms, “ that the loss of  
 “ men bears no degree of proportion to the  
 “ reinforcement, and has in effect been incon-  
 “ siderable.” The purpose of this reinforcement must therefore be, to provide for the protection of Nagpour, or, as Mr. Barwell expresses it, *to give that security to the dominions of the Berar Chief as to dispel every apprehension he may entertain of the hostilities with which he may be threatened.* From these explanations it is to be understood, that the Raja of Berar, who, with the assistance of the detachment, was to overset the Marhatta state, and to invade the Decan, wants two battalions of our Sepoys for the protection of his own capital, and the security of his dominions. There is, however, no reason yet to believe, that this Raja is at all disposed to avail himself of our assistance. On this day the Board does not know whether Col. Goddard has crossed the Nerbudda or not.

30th Dec. 1778.—The Governor moves, that seven hundred draughts may be sent with Major Camac to recruit Colonel Goddard’s army, and that they should march *without arms or ammunition.* However, he was afterwards obliged to yield to the remonstrances of Mr. Wheeler and  
 and

and Mr. Francis on this point, and let the recruits march with their arms, and to move that Camac might have two field pieces.

4th January, 1779.—The Governor informs the Board, from a private letter of Colonel Goddard, dated 30th of November, that he was arrived at the banks of the Nerbudda, after a fatiguing march, through difficult passes in the mountains, and that he then saw no impediment to his crossing that river.

7th January.—A letter arrived from Colonel Goddard of the 2d and 5th of December, informs the Board that he had crossed the Nebudda, and was encamped on the southern banks of that river, within the territory of Berar, where he waited to be informed of the Rajah's final resolutions. He says, that all the artillery and gun-carriages were much shattered, and in want of repair; but that the number of sick was reduced from a thousand to about four hundred. Letters received from Moodajee Boosla, and his ministers, of the 5th of December. Instead of joining Colonel Goddard, the Rajah gives Mr. Hastings a great deal of good advice, both moral and political, concerning the preservation of peace, fidelity to engagements, justice, clemency, &c. but in particular, he recommends it to him to act with deliberation, and to proportion his means to his end; observing, “ that

“ it is a proverb, that whatever is deliberately  
 “ done is well done.”

On the whole it appears clearly by these letters, that the Rajah never had an idea of the nature or extent of Mr. Hastings's views, much less of breaking with the Peshwa and the Nizam, or of entering into any engagements with this Government that could lead him to a rupture with either of them. He vindicates the Peshwa from the designs imputed to him by the Board, of a secret connection with the French, and offers his mediation. This may be considered as a step towards taking a direct part with his countrymen, if his mediation be not acquiesced in. At all events he disclaimed every thought of acting against them. After enumerating the Chiefs and their forces, who were prepared to oppose Colonel Goddard, he expressly says, “ The  
 “ junction of a body of my forces with his  
 “ would avail nothing in the face of such large ar-  
 “ mies, but would only involve me in the greatest  
 “ losses; yet neither was it adviseable for him to  
 “ return, which would diminish the awe and  
 “ respect in which he was held.” In the end he says, that “ the times require that a concili-  
 “ ation take place with the Poona ministers.”

11th January.—Mr. Francis, finding that the Governor General observed a profound silence on the subject of Moodajee Boosla's letters, and that no instructions whatsoever were to be sent

to Colonel Goddard, after waiting till the council held this day was on the point of breaking up, thought it necessary to record a Minute, in which his sentiments are stated at large respecting Modajee Boosla's conduct, and the critical position of the detachment. In this Minute the contents of the above letters are strictly canvassed, and a conclusion drawn from them, that recalling the detachment would be the most advisable step to be taken in a situation which admits of no one eligible resolution. To this Minute the Governor declared he did not think it necessary or proper to reply. In a day or two *after* the Board received the first intelligence, by way of Madras, of the motion of a detachment from Bombay towards Poona, for the professed purpose of reinstating *Ragoba*.

January 25th.—Letters of the 30th of December, received from Moodajee Boosla, confirming in the most explicit terms the declaration he had made some weeks before in his letters to Colonel Goddard and to the Governor; still urging the necessity of an accommodation with the Poona government, and refusing to join the Company's forces against them. On this day the Governor, notwithstanding his professed resolution not to answer Mr. Francis's Minute of the 11th instant, quotes and reprobates the opinion contained in it, in terms full of passion and contempt. Yet, with so many new and material

rial facts before him, with the certain knowledge of Moodajee Boosla's final resolutions, and of the measures taken at Bombay, he himself proposes nothing, but leaves Colonel Goddard without orders or instructions of any kind.

28th January.\*—Letters of the 12th of December, received from Bombay, advising the Board that their forces, (amounting to 3410, officers included) had actually taken the field, to conduct Ragoba to Poona; that they had come to this resolution on the 12th of October; that they had concluded a new treaty with Ragoba; that their latest intelligence from Europe gave them not the smallest apprehension of danger to Bombay in the absence of their forces; that the whole conduct of their expedition was intrusted to a committee, consisting of Messrs. Carnac, Egerton, and Mostyn; that whatever turn affairs might take at Poona, they should certainly require a considerable augmentation of their force to defend the new acquisitions, and to garrison Bombay; that Mr. Draper dissented from the whole of the measure; and that Hyder Ally continued to shew a disposition very favourable to the French. They conclude with requesting Government to commence immediately sending them their annual supply. In consequence of the preceding advices, the Governor promised to lay some propositions before the Board in a few days,

\* Vide Consultations 1st Feb.



1st February.—Letters of the 6th of January received from Colonel Goddard. He was still in the same position at Hussunabad, on the banks of the Nerbudda, but proposed moving in a few days towards Poona. From an accurate map of the route, drawn by Mr. Smith, who accompanied Colonel Upton, the distance between these two places appears to be about 470 English miles.

By Colonel Goddard's last letters it appears, that after crossing the river, he had deputed Lieutenant Weatherstone to Nagpour, in order to press Moodajee Boosla to conclude the treaty, and immediately to enter upon the execution of it, but without the smallest success: that he declined entering into a treaty, or taking any active part whatever till further accounts might arrive from Calcutta. To colour this refusal, Moodajee Boosla pleads the part taken by the Council of Bombay in favour of Ragoba: and solicits, as well as recommends, the relinquishing the cause of the latter, and accepting terms from the present ministerial party. It should be observed, however, that Moodajee Boosla had taken his resolution long before it was possible for him to have heard of the motions at Bombay. His letter to Colonel Goddard of the 23d of November is written in nearly the same terms with those of the 30th of December, to Mr. Hastings; but the army did not move from Bombay before the 22d of November. It must, never-

nevertheless, be admitted, that the support given to Ragoba would naturally confirm Moodajee Boosla in his first resolution, considering that, as Colonel Goddard observes, “ an attention to, “ and observation of, the interest of both “ would be an impracticable task to this Government, and irreconcilable to themselves ; “ and that Moodajee Boosla’s views are incompatible with the measures now adopted in favour of Ragoba.” The Court of Directors cannot fail of taking notice how often and how expressly this event was foretold by Mr. Francis. Goddard says, “ that the schemes of the gentlemen at Bombay, and the active part they “ have taken in support of Ragoba, have destroyed all hopes of concluding the proposed “ alliance with the Court of Nagpour, until it “ may be judged expedient by this government “ to direct the former to be relinquished, in order to leave room for the entire and free adoption of the latter.”

Whether this be a mere pretence or not, to excuse his refusal to accede to the proposed alliance, or whether he ever really formed the project attributed to him of asserting a claim to the supreme power of the Marhatta state, is much to be questioned. Colonel Goddard himself takes notice of *the inconsistency of his labouring so strenuously for the interest of the Peshwa, with whom he means soon to be engaged in hostilities, and considers*

considers his answer to this objection as *a refinement upon policy, that might almost lead one to suspect he was not altogether serious, and determined upon his Sittarab expedition.*

By Mr. Weatherstone's letters to Colonel Goddard it appears, that the Government of Berar " were determined not to take any active  
 " part whatever with the Company's armies;  
 " that they had a thousand arguments to oppose  
 " to those he urged in favour of the plan for  
 " assuming the dignity of Rajah of Sittarah,  
 " particularly the faith pledged, and the alliance of friendship they had sworn with the  
 " present Peshwa; that their asserting their pretensions to the sovereignty would meet with  
 " numberless oppositions, and that a victory  
 " could not be without shedding much blood,  
 " and at the expence of their violating the  
 " sacred engagements before entered into by  
 " them." When the force and effect of these declarations are considered, it will rest with Mr. Hastings to satisfy the Company that his plan, stated in the instructions to Mr. Elliott, and in which he has embarked so deeply, was not built without a foundation.

Mr. Weatherstone says, that " the first wish  
 " of that court seems now to set aside our connection with Ragoba; the supporting of whom,  
 " the Dewan said, he was convinced was highly  
 " impolitical,

“ impolitical, and would in the end be fully  
 “ proved so; that that Chief was held in univer-  
 “ sal abhorrence, and that the prejudices in the  
 “ Decan against him would not easily, if ever,  
 “ be removed.”

The remainder of Mr. Weatherstone's letters will be found to contain many particulars that deserve the attention of the Court of Directors; especially a clear explanation of the views, principles, and policy of the Court of Nagpour, of all which the Governor General does not appear to have had any precise information, or any accurate idea. He concludes with saying, “ that the Rajah and Dewan expressed a strong  
 “ desire that the detachment might not move  
 “ forward towards Poona, but remain in the  
 “ neighbourhood of Berar,” and in the mean time be employed in conquering some adjacent districts for the Rajah's benefit. All the preceding letters were read in Council on the 1st of February, 1779, when the Governor said, that he had not had time to prepare the propositions which he intended to lay before the Board. His intentions, whatever they may be, have not yet transpired; but no orders from hence can now affect the motions of the detachment. Supposing Colonel Goddard to have marched on the 12th of January, he ought to be at Poona before any letters written at this time can reach him. This Government have no other know-  
 ledge

ledge of the difficulties and opposition he is likely to meet with, than what may be collected from Moodajee Boosla's letters. The Board is equally uninformed of the actual strength and condition of his army. On these points the Governor General observes a profound silence. It may be concluded, however, from the resolution to send two battalions, with a draft of 700 recruits to reinforce Colonel Goddard, that his army must have suffered considerably by sickness or desertion. It is known that Captain Wray's regiment of cavalry was totally ruined, and that he and several other officers had obtained leave, under one pretence or other, to return to Bengal. Col. Goddard's public orders of the 1st of November, accidentally produced at the Board of Ordnance by Colonel Pearse, begin with declaring, that "the unmilitary and unex-  
 " ampled spirit of disaffection to the service,  
 " which had so manifestly displayed itself in  
 " the frequent desertions from the corps of ca-  
 " valry and infantry, within a few days, was  
 " become a matter of the most serious and im-  
 " portant consideration." There can be no doubt but his numbers must be greatly reduced; nor is there any chance of his being joined by the reinforcement under Major Camac. When the detachment was ordered, it was supposed that a junction might be effected somewhere in Berar. Colonel Goddard is now on his way to Poona; but whether Major Camac is to follow

low him or not, is a point yet unknown to the Board.

On the 19th of December, the success of the enterprize against Poona was still undetermined.

February 4th, 1779.—The Governor General lays his propositions before the Board, for new instructions to Colonel Goddard, and for resolutions on the late advices from Bombay. The form in which these voluminous papers are drawn up seems more than commonly loose, confused, and intricate. Whether they were intended to be so, or whether they were hastily thrown together, without any sort of consideration or advice, may be doubted. Mr. Hastings's first general object is to heap as much censure as possible on the Presidency of Bombay, as well for what they have themselves done, as for the obstacles which, he says, they have thrown in the way of his negotiations with Moodajee Boosla; his second purpose plainly appears to be, to break the treaty they have concluded with Ragoba, though certainly warranted, as he himself confesses, by our letter to them of the 17th of August, 1778; and to revert, if possible, to his favourite alliance with the Rajah of Berar. To accomplish this design, he proposes that Colonel Goddard (whose march to Poona he approves, though strictly not justifiable under the last orders of the Board of the

23d of November) shall continue to hold his command, independent of the Government of Bombay; that he may demand reinforcements from that Presidency, which he was sent originally to reinforce, but these not to be commanded by any officer of a rank superior to his own; that he shall be appointed the Minister of this government at the court of Poona, independent of the Presidency of Bombay; that he shall demand of Ragoba a reimbursement of the expences of the expedition, at two lacks a month from the 1st of June 1778, in addition to the sum of two lacks and a half, stipulated by the treaty *in full*, for the expences of the Bombay army; that, in case of a refusal, he shall either return to Berar, or retire to the lands ceded to the Company, which it seems are to be kept, notwithstanding the treaty is to be annulled; that the Presidency of Bombay shall be peremptorily required and commanded, in such case, to recall their troops from Poona, and from the Marhatta dominions; that the instructions already given to Colonel Goddard do remain in full force, and that he be directed to resume the negotiations with the Government of Berar, and to treat with it on the grounds of these instructions, whenever an occasion shall offer to execute them consistently with the foregoing resolutions.

8th February, 1779.—Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis deliver their opinion at large, on the Governor's Propositions; the Court of Directors will judge whether any thing advanced in support of them, either as fact or argument, remains unrefuted; the minutes will not admit of being abstracted, but it may be sufficient to state the general principles on which the propositions are opposed.

I. It is taken as a point admitted *in the Governor's own terms*, that the treaty with Ragoba is warranted by our instructions; that it has received the firmest and fullest ratification that could be given to it by the contracting parties; and that it therefore can not admit either of amendment or addition.

II. It is contended that the additional demand, to be made by Colonel Goddard, is unjust, and can never be admitted by Ragoba; and that, even were it granted, it would not amount to a reimbursement of our actual expence.

III. That the conditional order prescribed to Colonel Goddard, and to the Presidency of Bombay, in case of a refusal, are equivalent to a formal renunciation of the treaty.

IV. That the independent command, pretended to be vested in Colonel Goddard, while he



he co-operates with the Presidency of Bombay, and acts on the same grounds with their army, is highly dangerous in itself, and cannot take effect without subverting the fundamental principles of military discipline and subordination.

V. That a junction of the two detachments, which these instructions positively preclude, may, in some cases, be essential to their mutual safety; and in many cases necessary to the success of their operations.

VI. That the vesting Colonel Goddard with separate powers, from this government to treat with the Court of Poona, independent of the Presidency of Bombay, tends to reduce the credit and influence of that Presidency, for no adequate or avowed object; and that it stands in direct contradiction to the Company's express orders, given on occasion of the separate powers delegated to Colonel Upton\*.

VII. That an attempt to renew the negotiation with Moodajee Boosla, besides all former objections to the measure, is not warranted by the experience the Board have had of his character and disposition, or by the treatment already received from him; nor can it be reconciled to the late treaty with Ragoba.

\* Vide General Letter 7th February, 1777, Paragr. 21, 22, 23, 24.

In the face of these, and many other arguments the propositions were voted by Mr. Barwell and Mr. Hastings, without reply.

9th February.—The Governor's letter of this date to Moodajee Boosla contains some remarkable passages. He laments, rather than complains, of the *distrust* entertained by that Chief; and “declares that, had he accepted of the terms offered him by Colonel Goddard, and concluded a treaty with this government upon them, he should have held the obligation of it superior to that of any engagement formed by the Government of Bombay; and should have thought it his duty to maintain it, &c. against every consideration, *even of the most valuable interests and safety of the English possessions intrusted to his charge.*” At the same time, however, he reminds him, “That the original intention of sending an English army from this to the Western side of India, was to assist the Government of Bombay in the accomplishment of a plan concerted with the actual rulers of the Marhatta State.”—He concludes with professing, that his disposition and wishes remain the same; that nothing is yet lost; and that he wishes to be guided by Moodajee Boosla's inclinations.

In the Governor's minute, recorded the 15th of February, and Mr. Francis's, recorded the

2d of March, the general subject of the negotiations with Ragoba and Moodajee Boosla, and the march of the two armies, is thoroughly discussed; and such lights thrown upon the whole transaction, as leave no doubt concerning the true motives of the persons engaged in it.

25th February, 1779.—The Governor lays before the Board a paper received the day before from Madras, containing intelligence of the defeat of the Bombay army near Poona; which he says, he believes to be *but too true*; but does not think proper to propose any immediate measures to be taken in consequence.

Mr. Francis, finding no proposition made by the Governor, moves that orders be sent to General Stibbert, to put him on his guard, and to hold the troops stationed in Rohilcund, and in Owde, in readiness to march.—The motion was opposed both by Mr. Barwell and the Governor, as *unnecessary and unreasonable*; and the Governor said, he wished it had not been made; yet in the end, it was agreed to, with an amendment proposed by Barwell, which carried the principle of the motion much farther than Mr. Francis intended, viz. “That the two brigades should be immediately assembled and encamped.”

Mr.

Mr. Francis stated the evident contradiction contained in the arguments used by the Majority, and opposed the amendment.

1st March, 1779.—Letters of the 7th of February from Fort St. George, and of the 26th of January from Colonel Goddard, were read at the Board; the former was signed by Sir Eyre Coote, and states in strong terms the fatal consequences likely to attend the disaster at Poona, particularly to that government. They observe, that “by one ill-timed and un-  
 “fortunate enterprize the reputation of our  
 “arms is sullied, and the friendship of the  
 “principal Indian states hazarded, or lost for  
 “ever; and that too at a period when we are  
 “engaged in a war which calls for the exer-  
 “tion of all our force, and the good-will of  
 “every state in alliance with us.” In the conclusion, they recommended to the Board to direct Colonel Goddard’s retreat through Berar, towards the coast of Orixia, and the Northern Circars.

By Colonel Goddard’s letter it appears, that he was uninformed of the event at Poona; he incloses a letter of the 11th of January from General Carnac and Colonel Egerton, in which they advise him to proceed either to Broach or Surat, or to remain on the borders of Berar; but do not desire him to advance towards  
 Poona.

Poona.—He himself is of opinion, “ That a  
 “ prospect of being able to effect the revolution  
 “ in favour of Ragoba themselves, is their mo-  
 “ tive for expressing so little anxiety about the  
 “ arrival of the detachment.”

The Governor, without proposing any instruction for Colonel Goddard, moved that General Stibbert should be ordered to send the first brigade across the Jumna, and to encamp it on the other side. Mr. Francis expressed, at once, his sense of the measure; but desired that the further consideration of it might be put off till the next morning: This was agreed to by the Governor, on condition that he might be allowed an opportunity of considering Mr. Francis's objections to the motion, before they were brought into debate at the Board. Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Francis, concurring in opinion, drew up their reasons in the form of a joint protest, which they sent next morning to the Governor, about an hour before the Council met.

2d March, 1779.—The Governor began by declaring, that he had not read the joint protest; and delivered in a minute, retracting that of yesterday. The minutes on both sides deserve attention, but cannot easily be abstracted.

When the business was over, Mr. Francis, finding that no instructions were intended for Colonel Goddard, moved that orders should be

sent him immediately to retire to Berar, and from thence towards the coast of Orixá, and the Chicacole Sarcár, supposing always that he should not have reached the other side of India before he received these orders: The motion, it was agreed, should lie for consideration.

4th March, 1779.—The debate of this day, in consequence of which Mr. Francis's proposition was rejected by the majority, will be found to throw considerable light upon the political views and principles of Mr. Hastings. He objects to the motion for two reasons: 1st, Because he thinks it probable that Colonel Goddard has resumed his negotiation with Moodajee Boosla: 2dly, Because the proposed route lay through the dominions of the Nizam; "who, it is not to be expected would consent to their passage; nor is this a time to furnish him with a pretext for open hostilities against the Government." Yet the negotiations which Colonel Goddard is supposed to have resumed, and which Mr. Hastings thinks it unsafe to interrupt, have the invasion of the Nizam's dominions for one of its principal objects,

In the remainder of the Governor's minute, the Court of Directors will see, that conquest and extension of dominion are now his professed and avowed objects; and that Mr. Francis, in endeavouring to confine the Company's armies

armies within their actual possessions, is supposed to prescribe *narrow limits* to this Government. The minute recorded by Mr. Francis on the 8th of March contains every thing that appeared to him necessary for the general defence of his motion, or to refute the general doctrines advanced and maintained by Mr. Hastings.

Mr. Francis concluding, from some words which fell from the Governor in reply to the first motion, that his principal objection lay against moving the detachment towards the Chicacole Sarcar, and wishing at all events to withdraw the detachment from a situation of danger into the country of a friend, moved again that Colonel Goddard might be ordered to retreat into Berar. This proposition, however, met with the same fate with the preceding; but whether the arguments, used against the second motion can be reconciled to those which were employed against the first, deserves consideration. In this place, however, it is material to be observed, that, supposing any future turn of events should, in the eyes of those who judge only by events, render it a fortunate circumstance that Colonel Goddard should have proceeded to Surat, Mr. Hastings will have no merit to claim from that measure, or from any advantageous consequences which

may attend it. In this \*day's debate, he expressly says, "That he wishes equally with Mr. Francis, for the return of the detachment to Berar, and equally dreads to hear of its proceeding to the other coast."

In the same debate he observed that the plan for restoring Ragoba to the administration of the Government at Poona had failed, and that Colonel Goddard therefore, from the instant he received certain advice of that conclusion, was under *express orders* to recur to his negotiations with Moodajee Boosla, which necessarily and unavoidably implied his return to Berar. It will hereafter appear that Colonel Goddard received thanks and rewards for taking that very step, which, according to Mr. Hastings's present declaration, must be contrary to the express orders of the Board. Admitting that Colonel Goddard was justified by the necessity of his situation, in proceeding by forced marches to Surat, as soon as he had heard of the defeat near Poona, Mr. Hastings clearly has no share in the merit of that resolution, or in any good consequences that might have attended it, since, according to his express orders, Colonel Goddard ought to have returned to Berar.

March 10th, 1779. † — Letter received from Col. Goddard, dated the 5th of February, from

\* 4th March, 1779.

† Extract upon Consultations 11th March.

Brampour;



Brampour ; in which he says, he was determined to move next day towards Surat, according to orders he had received from the Select Committee at Bombay ; who, on the 22d of January, tell him, they are not able to give him any precise information as to the reasons of the return of their army, or the probable consequences of it.


Colonel Goddard arrived at Surat about the 26th of February ; having not seen an enemy, nor met with any opposition whatever, in his march from Brampour. In his last letter, dated at Surat, on the 28th of October, 1779, he informs the Board, that the Minister of the Peishaw had, in plain and direct terms, declared to him, in the name of his Master, that he would not accede to the proposals he (Colonel Goddard) had made him, or conclude peace with the English, unless Ragoba was delivered up to him, and Salfette restored to the Marhatta Government.

In consequence of this declaration, Colonel Goddard had broken off the negotiation, and proposed setting out for Bombay immediately, to concert the plan of future operations with the Select Committee there.

That Committee, in their letter of the 31st of October, 1779, inform the Governor General,

neral, and Council, that they had strongly recommended to General Goddard not to precipitate matters, but to endeavour to gain time, and defer any declaration until they were in a better condition for an active war.

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